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UNPICKING PRIEST’S BOOTSTRAPS
(Philosophy of Mathematics)
ABSTRACT. Graham Priest has argued that the fruits of classical set theory can be obtained by naive means through
a puzzling piece of reasoning often known as the bootstrapping argument [Priest, 2006]. I will demonstrate that
the bootstrapping involved is best understood as viciously circular and thus, that these fruits remain forbidden. The
argument has only one rehearsal in print and it is quite subtle. This paper provides reconstruction of the argument
based on [Priest, 2006] and attempts some fixes and alternative construals to get around some elementary problems.
Despite these efforts the argument remains unconvincing.
1. INTRODUCTION
The bootstrapping argument makes use of a pleasing model-theoretic construction the highlights of which we
briefly sketch. Let naive set theory, abbreviated NST , be the conjunction of the axioms of extensionality and
naive comprehension articulated in the underlying paraconsistent logic LP [Priest, 1979].1 The use of just
these axioms is seen as attractive as both of them have a strong intuitive pull and are arguably constitutive of
the concept of set. Extensionality tells us that any two sets with the same members are, in fact, one and the
same. Naive comprehension tells us that every definition of a collection gives us a set. The latter principle is
inconsistent in classical logic, hence the use of a paraconsistent logic LP. An LP-model is simply a model of
the non-classical logic LP [Priest, 2008]. Here is the result:
Proposition 1. (Priest) Suppose thatM is a classical model of ZF containing two inaccessible cardinals κ1
and κ2. Then there is an LP-modelM∼ = 〈D∼, I∼〉 such that:
(1) M∼ is a model of ZF +NST ; and
(2) M∼ contains a modelN whereN is a classical model of ZF .2
Informally speaking, this tells us the given an ordinary model of ZF , one may obtain a non-classical model of
ZF +NST which contains a classical model of ZF : it is an interesting result. The basic strategy for the proof
I would like to thank Zach Weber for his helpful comments on an early draft of this paper.
1It should be noted that Priest (and others) have considered logical frameworks other than LP for the purposes of a naive set theory. For
example, non-monotonic LP and logics with weak relevant conditionals. Such logics are usually able to prove more than LP, which is very
weak, and are thus more useful for mathematics. That said, the bootstrapping argument is specifically concerned with a naive set theory
based on LP and as such, this paper predominantly focus upon it.
2I have stated the result in much the same way as Priest, however, it is not optimal. Using standard techniques, it can be seen that one
inaccessible suffices for Priest’s result (see Lemma 8.2 in [Kunen [2006], p141]).
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is to take the modelM and use that to define a modelM∼ which has the requisite properties. We don’t need
to concern ourselves with any more detail than this other than to note that the result is established using the
ordinary tools of classical ZF . This will be important later.
Priest then argues that this puts the naive set theorist in a position to recapture or make use of classical set
theory. This would be a desirable position for the naive set theorist. They could claim to have a non-classical
foundation for mathematics but still be able to use the well understood tools of classical ZF . He makes the
following remarks:
... to the question of what to make of the theorems of orthodox set theory, ZF, on this approach.
The answer is obvious. Since the universe of sets is a model of ZF (as well as naive set theory),
these hold in it. We may therefore establish things in ZF in the standard classical way, knowing
that they are perfectly acceptable from a paraconsistent perspective. We cannot, of course,
require the theorems of ZF to be consistently true in that universe; but if, on an occasion, we
do require a consistent interpretation of ZF, we know how to obtain this too. The universe of
sets has a consistent substructure that is a model of ZF. [Priest, 2006, p257-258]
The big question here is: what should the naive set theorist make of the orthodox set theory ZF?3 He claims
that we can have our cake and eat it on the basis of the following argument:
Claim 2. The universe of sets is a model of ZF as well as naive set theory.
Claim 3. Hence, the theorems of ZF are perfectly acceptable from a paraconsistent perspective.
Claim 4. Thus, the naive set theorist can establish claims in ZF in the standard classical way.
I believe Claim 2 is intended to be understood as following from Proposition 1. As I understand it, Claim 3 is
supposed to follow from Claim 2 since Claim 2 tells us that the universe of sets is a model of ZF . Moreover,
if we want to go further and demand consistency, we could work within the classical modelN of ZF given by
Proposition 1.
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. In the next section, we examine the argument for Claim 2 and find
its justification wanting. In Section 3, we examine the prospects of establishing Claim 3 in the absence of Claim
2. Finally in Section 4, we reexamine the argument for Claim 2 in the light of the previous section and find
that even we turn a blind eye to its weak justification, the argument from Claim 2 to Claim 3 rests on circular
reasoning.
3In deference to Priest, we’ll stay in ZF although standard foundation practice includes the axiom of choice and thus, ZFC.
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2. THE UNIVERSE OF SETS IS A MODEL OF ZF AS WELL AS NAIVE SET THEORY
As has been noted before, the argument from Proposition 1 to Claim 2 is troubling: at best, it is underdone
[Weir, 2004, Young, 2014]. The proof of Proposition 1 shows how to construct a particular modelM∼ with the
desired properties given a classical modelM containing inaccessible cardinals κ1 and κ2. On this basis, Priest
claims:
We may therefore suppose that the true interpretation of the language of set theory has these
properties. [Priest, 2006, p257]
From here it would be easy to obtain Claim 2, however at first blush, this seems far too bold. Just because
we have a particular interpretation of NST which contains a model of ZF , this does not tell us that the true
interpretation of set theory enjoys this property. To emphasise this point, we should note that if there are any
models of ZF , then the are ill-founded models of ZF .4 The received interpretation of classical ZF tells us that
the true interpretation of the membership relation is well-founded. Thus, the existence of this pathological,
ill-founded model does not tell us that membership is really ill-founded. Similarly the existence ofM∼ doesn’t
give us much reason to think that the true interpretation of membership is like that ofM∼. All we’ve learned is
that this possibility has not been ruled out. Priest is aware of this problem and states:
“Specifying the correct interpretation is always a further issue. The model M∼ at least suf-
fices to demonstrate the possibility of interpretations of naive set theory that have the above
properties.” [Priest, 2006, p257]
But this still leaves open the question: what positive reason do we have to think that the true interpretation of
set theory is likeM∼? This is all we get:
“This is an appealing picture. The cumulative hierarchy (up to κ1) is a perfectly good, consis-
tent set theoretic structure; but it does not exhaust the universe of sets. There may be non-well-
founded sets (such as the set of all sets) and inconsistent sets, such as the set of all sets that are
not members of themselves.” [Priest, 2006, p257]
So the best reason we are given for accepting that the universe of sets is like M∼ is the congeniality of that
assumption. Given the load this claim bears in the overall argument, I think it would be fair to say that this
defence is insufficient and stop here. However, we shall see later that even if we grant Priest leave to provide a
better argument, a deeper trap lies ahead.
4A simple argument using the compactness theorem suffices for this purpose.
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3. THE THEOREMS OF ZF ARE PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE FROM A PARACONSISTENT PERSPECTIVE
Given the poor defence provided for Claim 2, we might wonder whether Claim 3 can still be defended in
its absence. Can we argue that ZF is acceptable from a paraconsistent perspective using Proposition 1, but
without going through Claim 2? If we look more closely at Proposition 1, we see that it is essentially a relative
consistency proof. Among other things, it tells us that if ZF is consistent (i.e., has a model), then the theory
ZF +NST is non-trivial (i.e., has a model in which not everything is true). At best, this result tells us from
the classical (not paraconsistent) perspective, that NST is sensible, in the sense of being non-trivial. Loosely
speaking, it tells us that if ZF is coherent (in a very weak sense), then so is ZF +NST . This is a nice result.
However, this is not Priest’s goal: for his purposes, he wants something like the converse. He wants to know
that ZF is consistent from the paraconsistent point of view. Thus, he wants something like a solution to the
following problem:
Problem 5. If there is a non-trivial LP-model of NST , then there is a classical model of ZF .5
Informally speaking, a positive answer to this problem would tell us that if NST is coherent (in the weak sense of
being non-trivial), then so is classical ZF . This would tell us that from the paraconsistent perspective, classical
ZF makes a minimal amount of sense. It doesn’t tell us exactly what to make of the theorems of ZF , but it’s a
good start. Ideally, the naive set theorist would solve this problem using only the tools afforded by NST .6
One might be tempted to think a solution to Problem 5 is offered by the modelM∼. M∼ is a model of NST
which contains a model N of classical ZF . It could appear that we simply obtained the classical model N
from the LP-model M∼. This, however, is fool’s gold. Proposition 1 begins with the assumption that we
already have a model of ZF + 2 inaccessibles from which we gain a model of NST which contains a model
of ZF . So we don’t really get our classical model of ZF from the LP-model but rather the original model of
ZF +2 inaccesibles. More formally, we might put this as follows:
Fact 6. Con(ZF +2 inaccessibles)→Con(ZF).7
We start by assuming there is a model of ZF which contains two inaccessible cardinals and we then obtain a
model of ZF . In this shape, the result is an obvious triviality. But worse still, Problem 5 has a negative answer
5By a non-trivial LP-model, we mean a model in which at least one sentence is not both true and false.
6If NST is to live up to its foundational role, then it is important that it is strong enough to establish such claims and that we do not resort
to classical ZFC (at least until we’ve established that such a move is acceptable).
7We follow standard set theoretic conventions here in the use of predicate, Con. Con(ZF) can be understood as saying that there is no proof
of 0 = 1 using the axioms of ZF . We shall take it that is has been been formalised in the language of set theory. For a more precise account
of how to do this see Boolos’s [1993, p44]. However, we shall often exploit the completeness theorem and take Con(Γ) to say that Γ is
satisfiable. This is always acceptable if our latent metatheory is ZF .
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if we address it in classical ZF . The argument for 1 on page 256 can easily be seen to establish the following
general result:
Fact 7. IfM is a well-founded classical model of extensionality where for all x,y ∈M there is some z ∈M
such that x,y ∈ z, then there is a non-trivial LP-model M∼ of extensionality and naive comprehension: i.e.,
NST .
It is easy to see that the proof of this fact can be carried out in classical ZF (and indeed much weaker theories).
Moreover, classical ZF can easily prove that there is a well-founded model of extensionality satisfying the
condition above, which means that it can also show that there is a non-trivial model of NST .8 But then if
Problem 5 had a positive solution, we’d be able to prove Con(ZF) using ZF alone; which contradicts Gödel’s
second incompleteness theorem. We thus see that in the absence of Claim 2, it is not clear how we can get
to Claim 3: it is not at all clear that ZF is acceptable from the paraconsistent perspective. This highlights the
important role Claim 2 plays in Priest’s argument.
At this point we could consider an alternative goal for Priest. At heart, the bootstrapping argument was in-
tended to address the vague question of what to make of classical ZF from the paraconsistent perspective. We
just argued that without Claim 2 there is little reason to think that ZF is acceptable from the paraconsistent
perspective. But perhaps NST could recapture the theorems of ZF . While the naive set theorist may still doubt
their reliability, at least they could replicate the workings of the classical set theorist. A positive solution to the
following problem would go some way to realising this goal:
Problem 8. Is there some translation τ of the language of set theory into itself (for example we might try
binding quantifiers to a particular model) such that:
(1) if ZF ` A, then NST ` τ(A); and
(2) for some B, NST 0 τ(B).
The first condition set ups the recapturing of classical mathematics. We add the second restriction so that we
are forced to avoid trivial translations. Otherwise, for example, we could relativise every sentence to the set of
objects, x, which are such that every set is: identical and not identical to x; a member of and not a member of
x; and has x as a member and doesn’t have x as a member. Using naive comprehension it can be seen that such
a set exists in any model of NST , from which one can show by induction that NST ` τ(B) for all sentences B.9
That would be a very poor kind of recapture.
8Simply, letM be 〈ω,∈〉 and defineM∼ by letting a be, say, 5. See [Priest 2006, p256].
9We make use of the completeness theorem for LP here.
UNPICKING PRIEST’S BOOTSTRAPS 6
However, a solution to this problem would also clash with Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem. To see this,
suppose that a positive solution to this problem had been found using the lights of classical ZF . Now fix some
B such that NST 0 τ(B). Then by (1), we see that ZF 0 B. By the completeness theorem for first order logic, we
may then obtain a modelM of ZF ∪{B}. But this would again mean that we could establish the consistency
of ZF using ZF .
3.1. A remark onmetatheory. In both of these Gödelian responses, I have used an external, classical metathe-
ory. Given that I think it would be ideal to address these problems from the internal perspective of the NST
framework, this this warrants some further remarks. I think consideration of the internal approach raises some
new and interesting challenges the solutions to which would also be a major step forward for non-classical set
theory. A thorough investigation of this avenue is outside the scope of this paper, however, this presents no
problem for us in that we are only trying to show that Priest’s argument is incomplete.
Nonetheless, let us consider what it would be like to address Problem 5 in NST . There is an immediate issue
in that it isn’t clear that a classical model as defined in NST is particularly classical, hence it is not clear that a
solution to the problem would demonstrate what it purports to show at first blush. While it might be possible
to define a bivalent model-theoretic apparatus within the NST framework, it’s not at all clear that this is really
bivalent.10
Given the well-known weakness of LP, we may also have some cause to doubt whether such such a result could
be established in NST .11 It would be ideal to show that there can be no such proof, but in the absence of a
well-worked out way of doing metatheory in NST , it is difficult to know how to establish such a result.12 But
suppose, for the sake of argument, that an internal solution to Problem 5 could be provided. Then the Gödelian
arguments above draws out a significant tension between NST and classical ZF . While our goal was to be
able to take up the classical perspective of set theory in an fashion that is acceptable for the paraconsistent set
10For example, suppose we have an LP modelM of NST which contains someN whichM says is a classical model. Then all this tells
us is that
vN (∀ϕ (M |= ϕ ⇔M 6|= ¬ϕ)) ∈ {{1},{0,1}}.
However, it could still be the case that there is some ϕ such that vN (M |= ϕ) = 1 and yet vN (M |= ¬ϕ) = 1.
11This might give us reason to abandon LP as our foundational logic and opt for something stronger, perhaps a relevant conditional. Such
a path takes us further afield from Priest’s original motivations for the bootstrapping argument. If we do take this path, then a revision
to Problem 5 is warranted. Since we have revised to a new foundational logic, L , we are now interested in non-trivial models of naive
comprehension and extensionality over the new logic: call this NSTL . This then raises an interesting, new problem:
Problem 9. Is there a logicL such that NSTL is non-trivial and such that NSTL can prove that:
If NSTL has a non-trivial model, then ZF has a classical model.
This looks like a difficult problem. A positive answer could well provide us with some good reasons to accept paraconsistent set theory.
For the purposes of this paper I am content to leave it open.
12Presumably, we’d want to construct a counter-model, but this would appear to require technical tools which are available in classical ZF
but to which we lack access in NST .
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theorist, there is something awry in this situation from the classical perspective. One the one hand we know
that classical ZF is stronger than NST in that is able to provide a non-trivial model for it. On the other hand,
ZF seems weaker than NST given that there are simple model-theoretic propositions that are provable in NST
but not in ZF . In the absence of a clearly articulated NST version of Problem 5 it is not possible to properly
sharpen this point, but it would seem odd to claim to vindicate the classical perspective while at the same time
proving something that the classical perspective says is out of bounds.
4. A DEEPER PROBLEM
Recall that the goal of naive set theory, as construed here, is to be able to provide a foundation for mathematics
with the simple axioms of NST and the paraconsistent logic LP. The goal of the bootstrapping argument is to
show that one can take up naive set theory but still use the better understood and more user-friendly ZF . We
have seen that the argument for this contention rests on Claim 2: that the true interpretation of the language of
set theory satisfies ZF +NST . The argument for Claim 2 rests on two further premises:
Claim 10. Proposition 1 gives us a modelM∼ of NST which contains a classical model of ZF .
Claim 11. M∼ provides a compelling illustration of what the universe of sets ought to be like.
As we have seen already, the arguments for Claim 11 are thin at best. However, for the sake of argument, let us
suppose that they can be filled out. A further problem remains. First we note that Claim 10 is playing a crucial
role. We are only brought into position to countenance the intelligibility of Claim 2 on the basis of the model
M∼ given to us by Claim 10. Proposition 1 tells us that the possibility of Claim 2 holding has not been ruled
out. Without Claim 10, Claim 2 is little more than wishful thinking. Moreover, the positive argument for Claim
2 given by Claim 11 is only of value once the intelligibility of Claim 2 has been established using Claim 10.
This is why Priest takes such pains to demonstrate Proposition 1.
But now recall that Proposition 1 was established using the tools of classical ZF . In ordinary practice, there
would be nothing wrong with this move. However, here we have a problem. Claims 10 and 11 are premises in an
argument for Claim 2, which is then used to establish Claim 3: that the theorems of classical ZF are acceptable
from a paraconsistent perspective. But in order to establish the proposition behind Claim 10, we used classical
ZF . We thus assumed from the outset that classical ZF was acceptable from the paraconsistent perspective. The
conclusion that Priest wants to draw from this argument was assumed to to be true at the beginning. This is a
textbook case of question begging: Priest’s conclusion is one of his premises!13
13It is worth noting that we have only considered the possibility of establishing Proposition 1 using the classical ZF techniques adopted
by Priest. Moreover, it seems clear that Priest believes this external strategy is sufficient: “... the argument constructing M∼ above can
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To give it a slightly more informal gloss, we were trying to establish the credentials of classical ZF from a
paraconsistent perspective. We wanted show that even if we adhere to a non-classical foundation of naive set
theory, we can still make use of the tools of classical ZF . This was our goal. But only after such an argument
has been successfully executed, could we be licensed to use classical ZF . Priest, however, has broken the rules
and is already making use of classical ZF to establish a crucial premise in the argument toward this goal. Unless
Proposition 1 can be established using NST , and we been given no reason to think that it can be, we are forced
to see this as a clear piece of circular reasoning.
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classical perspective, we have good reason to think that the model provided is genuinely classical. However, as we discussed in Section 3.1,
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